Blockchain for peer-to-peer energy exchanges: design and recommendations by Vangulick, David et al.
Blockchain for peer-to-peer energy exchanges:
design and recommendations
David Vangulick
University of Liège and ORES,
Liège, Belgium
david.vangulick@ores.net




Abstract—Energy communities and peer-to-peer energy ex-
changes are expected to play an important role in the energy
transition. In this context, the blockchain approach can be
employed to foster this decentralized energy market. Our goal is
to determine the design that should allow a Distribution System
Operator (DSO) to accept peer-to-peer energy exchanges based
on a distributed ledger supported by the blockchain technology.
To this end, we will evaluate several designs based on criteria
such as acceptance of the wholesale/retail market, the resilience
of the consensus to approve a block, the accuracy, traceability,
privacy and security of the proposed schemes.
Index Terms—Blockchain, design comparison, DSO require-
ments, energy community
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the arrival of Bitcoin [1] and its subsequent success as
a cryptocurrency, the blockchain has emerged as a disruptive
factor in many areas, starting with banking transactions. With
blockchain 2.0 and the future version 3.0 allowing the use of
automated transactions, the energy sector is probably one of
the next sectors to be impacted by this new way of performing
verification and authentication of transactions between parties.
Blockchains can be regarded as decentralized and distributed
ledgers that keep track of any type of transaction. This move
towards the blockchain is likely to accelerate with the emer-
gence of energy communities where prosumers (customers
having their own generation asset) will want to exchange their
surplus generated energy with their neighbours and / or with
nearby companies / institutions.
To guarantee the rights and duties of each party and
to make the necessary link to the wholesale market, these
exchanges must be supervised by a neutral metering party
such as the distribution system operators (DSOs) as provided
for in French law [2] on collective self-consumption or in
the E-Cloud project [3]). Establishing the set of requirements
necessary to perform this supervision is the goal of this
paper, which is structured as follows: Section II clarifies
the energy community concept. Section III then states the
problem of interest in this paper. Section IV, after summarizing
the key characteristics of blockchain, we will challenge how
a blockchain is able to cope with the problem stated in
Section III. Section V concludes and provides directions of
further work.
II. ENERGY COMMUNITIES
There are many possible configurations of energy communi-
ties. In this document, we focus on the European context and
more precisely the Belgian (Walloon) and the French cases. In
this section, we describe the use cases chosen for the purpose
of this paper.
A. Collective self-consumption in France
In France, a series of decrees published in 2016 and
2017 specify the notion of collective self-consumption and
the role of the DSO. According to Article L315-2 of the
French Energy Code, self-consumption can be considered as
collective if the supply of electricity (mainly generated by
photovoltaic panels) of one or more producers to one or more
final consumers is organized through a single legal entity,
and the corresponding consumption and injection points are
located downstream of the same medium voltage (MV) / low
voltage (LV) substation. We can summarize this as a local
LV energy community. Regarding the allocation of quantities
produced and consumed, the decrees fix it by default in
proportion to the individual consumption of each consumer.
However, it leaves the possibility of allocating the electricity
produced to each consumer by applying a weighting coefficient
to the production. These decrees also set the conditions for
the injection of small surpluses into the grid. If this surplus
is not assigned to a third party, the decree specifies that
electricity injections into the public distribution network are
transferred free of charge to the DSO. If the collective self-
consumption operation has a storage facility owned by the
community, it will be considered as a consumer when it
stores electricity and as a producer when it releases it. Finally,
the electricity supplied by the market (supplier or retailer)
of a consumer participating in a collective self-consumption
operation is the difference between the load curve of its total
consumption and the reconstructed load curve of its production
quantities allocated in the framework of self-consumption. On
the other hand, the French Commission de Régulation de
l’Énergie requires that the supplier, and the related Balancing
Responsible Party, are informed of the modalities of allocation
of the quantities of electricity consumed to their customers
at each measurement step. This task is done by the DSO
who informs all suppliers of the rules for the allocation of
the production and the distribution retained. The notion of a
measurement step will play a key role in the next sections.
B. E-Cloud
The E-Cloud project [3] is funded by the Walloon Region
(Belgium) - in the framework of the Marshall Plan 4.0 - and
is coordinated by ORES (a Belgian DSO). An E-Cloud is
an integrated power distribution network feeding an existing
area of economic activity, which distributes electrical energy
to industrial or commercial sites that have agreed to be part
of the E-Cloud community. Optionally, a storage unit can
be placed in order to increase the consumption level of the
energy produced locally. It is an MV energy community.
The project is articulated around different work packages,
including the testing and the analysis of the data flows and
the organization of billing, the analysis of the regulatory
impacts (tariff and market models), and the search for an
optimal techno-economic configuration in order to maximize
the profits of each actor involved. In the context of this paper,
it is interesting to note that there are two information flows:
a real-time flow and an ex-post flow.
Real-time information (consumption and share of genera-
tion) is communicated to the consumers to help them define
their position and, thus, to take the necessary actions to
manage their demand and maximize their position. Practically,
the lack or excess of generated energy with respect to the
demand of a member defines the exchanges with the storage
device. However, the real exchanges with the storage device
depend on the positions of the different members of the E-
Cloud. Ideally, at the end of each market period, the storage
device should have perfectly compensated for the deviations
of the members of the E-Cloud.
Regarding the ex-post data, generators and consumers are
metered independently with a market period resolution. As
they are connected to the MV network, this market period
is 15 minutes. These metered quantities for generators are
important for subsidies related to renewable generation (e.g.
in Wallonia, the green certificate), and also for cross-checking
the energy generated at the settlement stage. With these
metering devices, it is always possible to track and check
the correctness of the exchanges. Given that decisions are
taken based on real time data and not on metered data, it
is needed to integrate the real-time data into a market step.
This integration has two main purposes. The first is to update
the storage ledger (which quantity of stored energy belongs to
each member). The second is to compute the market period
share of generation allocated to one participant by creating a
virtual generation meter device. The project will also have to
determine how to deal with the difference between the metered
consumption/generation and the integration of real-time data
(e.g. considered as network losses).
C. Selected use case
The cases presented only records the electricity generation
in the blockchain and the share of it amongst the different
parties (the DSO deals with the consumption separately). The
pricing of this generated energy is beyond the scope of this
paper. We will use a generalised energy community definition
which covers these two concepts and which will serve as a
basis for the remainder of this paper. It is defined by:
• a limited geographical area (e.g. same street, or same
residential block, same business zone);
• at least, one connection point between the community
and the public grid (in an extreme case, each participant
is connected to the public grid);
• the share of generated electricity allocated to one par-
ticipant is recorded in its own virtual generation meter
device
• the market face meter gives each measurement step (i.e.
15 minutes). Obviously, this must also be the case for the
consumption and (virtual) generation meters.
• generations units that are installed in the same geographi-
cal area as the community and are considered as common
asset(s) to the community (virtual power plant)
The link with the retail/wholesale energy market for a partic-
ular participant is created by a computed market face meter.
This computed market face meter logs the difference between
its consumption meter and its virtual generation meter.
Creating an energy community comes with several regula-
tory and contractual challenges, such as the exchange rules,
the open and non-exclusive property of the community (rules
for entering and leaving the community are transparent and
participation is not mandatory), the direct governance based
on auto-control, balanced rights and obligations, and clear
decision-making processes. Regarding the exchange rules, in
most energy communities (e.g. [4] or [5]), a local market is
created in order to meet the demand with the generation and
to define prices. This is not the focus of this paper and we
consider that the repartition of the energy between participants
and the energy prices are defined and fixed by contractual
agreement. We focus our analysis on issues associated with
the volume of energy recorded on the virtual meters.
III. PROBLEM STATEMENT
An energy community can reach social and market ac-
ceptance only if there is a strong and fair link between the
community and the retail and wholesale energy markets. To
this end, every grid operator has to ensure four properties
regarding the metered data: accuracy, traceability, security and
privacy.
Accuracy. Respect the legally prescribed accuracy, such as
described in [6].
Traceability. Ensure the origin of the generated energy and
the correct flow of transactions between the generators (virtual
power plant, or VPP) and each individual virtual generation
meter.
Privacy. Ensure privacy at an individual level – it must be
impossible to identify the total energy bill for one particular
customer based on the data exchanged at the community
level – and at community level – what is agreed within the
community belongs only to this community. Furthermore, it
has to be almost impossible for external parties to have access
to personal data.
Security. Protect the ledger and transactions from cyber-
attacks. Note that the risk of hardware tampering on the meter
device will not be covered here.
In the next section, we show how the blockchain concept




As summarized in [7], the blockchain is "an open, dis-
tributed ledger that can record transactions between two parties
efficiently and in a verifiable and permanent way." The first
running blockchain was theorized by Satoshi Nakamoto in
2008 [1]. This technology can now be used as the technolog-
ical layer such as identity management [8] (e.g. e-residency
[9]), food traceability [10] or even for health records [11].
A blockchain [12] is a chain of blocks serving as a con-
tinuous ledger of records. Cryptography is used to link the
blocks together and to protect the records against change. A
typical block consists of a header with a reference of the
previous block and who created it, a time stamp, and a list
of records. The most important function about the records is
their traceability. For each record, it is possible to trace its
origin and by whom it has been created and/or exchanged.
This is why, in most of the publications, these records are
called transactions. The verification of the correctness of
each transaction could be done by every participant (node)
of the chain. However, there is a specific role for creating a
block (and thus guarantee that the transactions within it are
correct). This is the role of the so-called miners, who provide
computational power to check the transactions and to put them
together to form blocks, in exchange for a fee.
B. General design
This section proposes a design that covers the issues of
accuracy, traceability, and privacy, while Section IV-C assesses
the security of this design against classical cyber-attacks.
1) Accuracy: From our definition of the energy commu-
nity (cf. Section II), the virtual generation meter must be
synchronized with market steps. In the conception of the
blockchain, this thus requires that a block is created exactly
at every market step. This requirement has an important
consequence on accuracy. Indeed, to avoid multiple investment
in metering and measurement devices, many energy commu-
nities use Electric Meter Pulse Output as an effective way to
have finer information than energy consumed over a market
step. These meters, already MID1 compliant, are equipped
with a serial port that communicates by e.g. infrared LED,
through the faceplate of the meter or RS485 wired link. This
port gives 32 to 100 millisecond pulses for each metered
amount of electrical energy, usually 1,000 to 10,000 pulses per
kilowatt-hour. In France, LV customers can use the Customer
1MID stands for the Measuring Instruments Directive 2014/32/EU.
Information Remote Outputs present on the Linky meter [15]
to obtain this information. The information exchange protocol
is based on the European standard EN 62056-3-1, also known
as DLMS/COSEM. In this case the information is already in a
digital format. Hence the basic information is MID compliant
but to remain at this level of accuracy, the value of energy put
into a blockchain transaction is an important parameter.
The MID meter integrates the energy for each market
step. Obviously, blockchain transactions cannot be broadcast
synchronously at every market step. Instead, by counting the
pulses at the output of a MID meter, a transaction is created
and broadcast if V kilowatt-hours are generated. Hence, it can
happen that a transaction is sent just after a market step. In this
case, it is added in the block corresponding to the next market
step, creating an inaccuracy between the block and the MID
meter. In order to be accepted by the wholesale/retail market,
the error due to the broadcasting process cannot exceed the
maximum permissible error (MPE) as defined in [6]. If Pmin
is defined as the minimum power corresponding to the value
of the current above which the error has to lie within MPE
(see annex MI-003 of [6]), then we can bound V as
V < PminMPE,
meaning that a maximum amount of V kilowatt-hours can
be integrated into the wrong market step. On the average for
multiple market steps, the measurement error of the value
contained in the blockchain ledger is equal to the error of
the MID meter.
This statement is only true if it is possible to ensure that
V is really coming from the corresponding MID meter. In
the blockchain, the solution to this requirement is a crypto
or digital signature. We call the device that creates and signs
each V a cryptometer. This is further detailed in the next
sub-section. It should be noted that the accountability of this
cryptometer could follow that of a classical energy meter (in
our examples, this is the DSO).
2) Traceability: Traceability is covered by design in the
blockchain through three means, the transaction model, the
Merkel tree and the consensus model.
a) Transactional model: The transactional model is de-
fined in Table I and is illustrated below. Consider two
TABLE I
BLOCKCHAIN TRANSACTIONAL MODEL
• Each generation unit that creates V has to digitally sign it by
using a private/public key cryptographic signature protocol;
• Each V has to be "consumed" into a transaction;
• In order to aggregate the generated energy, each generator sends
its V by putting it into a transaction to the VPP;
• All the public keys are known by the participant of the community;
• The VPP distributes the generated kilowatt-hours using a prede-
fined repartition rule to the different participants by means of their
public key;
• The VPP has to digitally sign this transaction by using the
private/public key cryptographic signature protocol.
generation units A and B and two participants (consumers)
for which we build the virtual generation meters X and Y,
respectively. For this example, only A and B are equipped with
a cryptometer. The list of transactions for one time period is:
1) Create 15 kilowatt-hours and credit it to device A
2) Transfer from A to VPP
3) Create 10 kilowatt-hours and credit it to device B
4) Transfer from B to VPP
5) Transfer to participants
• 8 kilowatt-hours from VPP to X (signed by VPP)
• 17 kilowatt-hours from VPP to Y (signed by VPP)
The detail of transaction 5 is as follows:
• Inputs
– Reference (hash) of transaction 2
– Reference (hash) of transaction 4
– Digital signature VPP
• Outputs
– Value: 8 kilowatt-hours to Output public key X
– Value: 17 kilowatt-hours to Output public key Y
The sum of the outputs must be equal to or less than the sum
of all inputs. If the sum of the output is less than the input, the
difference is considered as a transaction fee. For the sake of
simplicity, we consider that the fee is equal to zero. Obviously,
the repartition of the energy between X and Y has to be correct
as well, i.e. it must comply with the predefined arrangement
(c.f. Section II-C).
The proposed design of the transactional model combined
with the concept of cryptometer ensures that, at least at their
creation, kilowatt-hours are actually produced by generators
within the community. Considering that all these transactions
are broadcast to every node and afterward put into a block also
broadcast to every node, each participant of the community
is able to verify the correctness of the repartition. We will
now analyse how to prove that transactions are not modified
afterward by a malicious node or a cyber-attack, nor ransomed.
b) Merkle tree: The algorithm to prove that every
kilowatt-hour produced is correctly assigned to a transaction
and to trace it until its very origin uses the Merkle tree
methodology which has an interesting property called proof
of membership. The Merkle tree [13] is a tree in which two
leaves (two blocks) are hashed together to form a branch. The
branches are also hashed by pairing until a single hash is
created, the Merkle Root. This is illustrated on Figure 1. For
instance, by communicating only the path in bold in Figure 1,
it is possible to prove that the block 6 (and all the transactions
in it) is well a member of the root and has not been changed.
This is the proof of membership. A good example of this in
the context of a smart grid and smart meter is provided in
[14].
c) Consensus model: To avoid any influence of a mali-
cious node, the simple consensus algorithm described in Ta-
ble II is widely adopted in the blockchain world. Technically,
TABLE II
BLOCKCHAIN CONSENSUS ALGORITHM.
1) New transactions are broadcast to all nodes;
2) Each node creates a block with all the valid new transactions;
3) At each market period Ti a node is randomly selected and
broadcasts its block;
4) Other nodes check the validity of the block and, if they agree,
increment their chain;
5) If the majority of nodes agree, the block is definitively approved.
there are two main ways to randomly2 select a node at step 3.
The first method is the proof-of-work (PoW). In brief, nodes
have to solve a complex mathematical problem, for which the
computation power gives only a probability to solve it. This
can be compared to trying to solve a puzzle without having the
full picture. The only way to solve it is to try every possible
permutation. This is the consensus method that is used by
the two biggest existing blockchain technologies, Bitcoin and
Ethereum. One of the drawbacks of this method is that the
time to create a block is a function of the probability of solving
the complex mathematical puzzle. There is thus no possible
guarantee of creating a block on a regular and constant basis.
For instance, Bitcoin takes an average of 10 minutes to do
so. The second disadvantage is the huge amount of energy
consumption required to solve the mathematical problem. In
order to compensate for the cost of this energy, each time a
miner creates a block, it gets an extra specific reward (a token
or a coin in addition to the transaction fee).
In the second method, proof-of-stake (PoS), the miner is
chosen based on a measure of its wealth. For instance, a type
of PoS is used for Solarcoin. The greater the wealth of a node,
the larger its chances of being selected. Even if it is not already
implemented in existing blockchain, the PoS method could
be a good way to ensure that a block is created exactly at
each market time step Ti, and thus will meet the accuracy
requirement with a high probability. In addition, it requires less
computational power than PoW, and no reward is given to the
miner other than the transaction fee. However, there is still an
2We use the word "random" for the sake of simplicity, although the process
is not purely random. There is no way, however, to know exactly, in advance,
which node will be selected.
Figure 1. Merkle tree.
TABLE III
PROPOSED MINER SELECTION ALGORITHM.
Let K be the set of nodes willing to support the chain at a specific time.
1) Determine the wealth of each candidate miner. The simplest
definition of stake or wealth is the relative value of a node
compared to the other nodes. This value can be derived from
different criteria. In our use case, we choose the following wealth
criteria to define the wealth of a node k, for a given K and for









• E as the voting token corresponding to a subset of the
volume of kilowatt-hours in the previous transactions (more
kilowatt-hours increase the probability to generate the next
block)
• A is an age measure of the previous block: how old is the
last block created by a miner, how big is the probability to
create the next one.
• R is a reputation measure: miners that have already created
blocks than the other nodes will have a highest probability
to be selected for the next block creation.
The weights α, β and γ are weights contractually agreed on
within the community.
2) Randomize. Generate of a random number Uk for every candi-
date k with a uniform distribution in ]0, 1].




important issue: PoS may not promote enough consensus. To
be more specific, a block must point to some previous block,
normally the block at the end of the previously longest chain.
In a chain-based PoS, most blocks normally converge into
a single constantly growing chain. But, as the PoS requires
relatively little computation power, it is not costly to continue
to promote divergent chains by creating as many blocks as
there are forks. As a consequence, it would be impossible to
decide which fork is the correct one. This problem is known
as the nothing to stake issue.
A way to solve this issue is a specific implementation of
PoS known as the chain of activity (CoA) [15], [16], because
it promotes the largest chain. In our use case, the follow the
Satoshi method [17] to determine the miner is not applicable
because there are no more transactions after the one affecting
the generated kilowatt-hours to one virtual generation meter.
Hence, we propose an alternative method to realise the same
objective, described in Table III. This method relies on three
important aspects:
1) how a node declares itself as candidate,
2) the generation of Uk, and
3) how the maximum Wk/Uk is known by all nodes.
To realize this method, we create a special set of transactions
using a voting token and a selection algorithm described in
Table IV. This algorithm operates as an auction marketplace:
candidate miners place their offer in the form of a sum of
voting tokens. They may do this for a period between two
TABLE IV
TRANSACTIONS FOR CANDIDATE SELECTION.
1) For every created V , an associated voting token E is created
by the cryptometer and follows the same flow as described in
Table I. This token has a limited validity of d market periods.
2) Transaction candidate Txcandidate:
• Between Ti−1 + td (candidates gate opening) and Ti − te
(td and te are time delays to integrate the broadcast and
computing times) this transaction (Txcandidate) is sent by
every k candidates to the miner selected at the previous
block ksTi−1
• For one specific k, this transaction contains as input the
tokens (and the needed references of the transaction that
prove its ownership) that k wants to spend to increase its
probability to be selected. It is also signed by k.
• The output of Txcandidate is the public key of the current
selected node ksTi−1. This information is known by every
node because it is part of the block header information.
3) At Ti−te (candidates gate closure), based on the Txcandidates
received and other information contained in the chain (age of the
previous block, and reputation) the current selected node ksTi−1
calculates for each candidate k its Wk and generates Uk . ksTi−1
ignores all the Txcandidates that arrive too late by sending back
the same volume of E.
4) Based on these information, ksTi−1 determines the next selected
node ksTi by creating a new transaction (Txwinner) with as
input all the voting tokens E received together with its signature
and as output the public key of winner.
5) At Ti, as this transaction is integrated in the block created by
ksTi
it is broadcasted to all the nodes.
moments called "candidates gate opening" for the launch of
the selection and "candidates gate closure" for the end. After
calculation, the selected node is communicated. As the flow
of the voting token follows the same path as the energy, only
consumption nodes (virtual generation meter owners) could
act as miners.
3) Privacy: Blockchain as such does not provide privacy,
but rather anonymity, because all the transactions refer to the
public key as the identity of the participants (in computer
science this is generally referred as pseudonymity).
Furthermore, in a local community, the participants know
each other, and they have contracts binding them; it could
thus be possible to link their public key with their real
(physical) identity. In our concept of community, this is in fact
an advantage because every member of the community can
check how the exchanges are correctly processed and ensure
the robustness of the chain. However, there is a need for a
contractual arrangement between participants to not divulgate
this information outside the community.
For an external adversary, anonymity is a barrier to access
personal data. However, as the blockchain in our design serves
only to create data for the virtual generation meter, it is
impossible for any party to recover the whole electricity bills
of any participant from a message analysis attack (based on the
transaction data). The consumption data from the MID meter
at the participant’s connection point is not in the blockchain
but in the DSO system that is protected against cyber-attacks.
This shows that, regarding the privacy as defined in Section III,
our design is robust.
C. Resilience against cyber attacks
Attacks can be divided in two categories. The first, called
a greedy self-interested attack, is carried out by a participant
who wants to maliciously increase their own benefit at the
expense of the community or other participants. The second,
extortion, arises typically (but not exclusively) when the at-
tacker is outside the community and tries to destroy the trust
in the chain or to seriously disrupt the correct functioning of
the chain.
Note that we make the assumption that each participant
ensures a correct protection of their private key. Obviously, if
an attacker steals a private key, from the system point of view,
they become a participant in the community. The combination
of the digital signature, the hashing protocol and the Merkle
tree prevents adversary attacks such as an injection attack
(injecting a fabricated transaction in the chain) because the
attacker needs to steal the private key of the generator and of
the VPP, and transaction modification attacks (capture of the
transaction and attempt to tamper it) because it will change
the hash of the transaction. For these reasons, these attacks
are not described further here. It is also necessary to mention
that the attacks are limited to a small number in the order of
magnitude of the energy managed over a short time period.
1) Greedy self-interested attack: The first attack in this
category is the theft of energy. Given the transactional model
and the traceability, every node is able to check all the
transactions and ensures that there is no theft. This risk is
thus covered by design.
The second attack is the bride attack or double spend. We
have already discussed about the traceability of the origin
of the energy. There is, at this point, no risk of a double
spend. Nevertheless, as the transaction stops when it reaches
the virtual generation meter, the only party that is interested
in such a double spend and who might attempt tp do this
is the VPP, who could increase its profit by "selling" the
same energy to two different participants, by sending two
transactions during the same market period. The proposed
model ensures (traceability and consensus) that the miner only
selects one of these transactions. Subsequently, by checking
the block, the aggrieved participant may discover that they
have not received the amount of energy they were entitled
to, and thus rejects the block. Based on the same verification,
other nodes will also reject it and are going to maintain support
and mining based on the last valid block they found in the
network. There is then the case a of the so-called fork in the
chain. After a while (in the blockchain community, waiting six
blocks is generally accepted as a good practice), if the majority
of the nodes reject the bad blockchain, the malicious VPP is
discovered and encounters contractual reprisal measures, as
well as the miner who has failed to detect the fraud. The
attacker can still succeed in their attack if they create the
longest chain by manipulating the selection of the miner (select
them or an accomplice) and force the majority of the nodes to
accept his malicious block. This attack, the third one, is called
a Sybil attack. The attempt is not really worth it because the
profit is low (a few kilowatt-hours), but it can cause mistrust
of the community’s members about the resilience to external
attacks. We will discuss this in the next section.
2) Extortion: Generally speaking, the scenario of extortion
is to create a disruption with an attack and to ask for a
ransom to stop or for not to repeat the attack. In our use
case, this disruption first comprises creating one fork with
malicious transactions, then trying to force the other members
to accept it. The first stage of prevention is to circumvent
any manipulation of the selection of the miner. This can be
achieved by avoiding concentration of wealth. For this reason,
we recommend that:
• regarding the weights in the formula (1) of Wk:
γ < α < β
• the voting token E has a limited validity of 4 market
periods (d = 4).
This best-practice rule relies on the following arguments:
• with a high β, the notion of age of the last block directs
the choice of the miner to a node which is far in the past
regarding to the moment of the attack; in forcing the
attacker to prepare their blow well in advance increases
to the difficulty of a successful attack
• the attacker may wait until they have collected enough E
before launching their attack. Having a short validation
time implies that the attacker must precipitate their attack,
and hence does not grant them sufficient time to prepare
it as it would be necessary to take into account the large
value of β.
The second way to prevent a Sybil attack is to have a large
number of nodes and a large number of candidate miners.
Thus, the remaining questions in our design are 1) how to
motivate nodes to act as candidates and promote the longest
chain and 2) how to punish those who act maliciously or
incorrectly?
a) Motivation: As the miners are consumers, the first
motivation of the miner is to control the correct repartition of
the energy. In Section IV-B2, we explain that the difference
between output and input is the transaction fee. Until now,
we assume that this transaction fee is equal to zero, but it is
clearly a means used to motivate nodes to declare themselves
as candidates. For instance, the fee could be a fixed percentage
of the input of the transaction (e.g. transaction number 5
explained in Section IV-B2) .
b) Punishment: There are two options.
Three strikes blacklisting rule: where a node has been
deemed eligible to a create block three times, but the agent
who controls the node did not create a block or created a bad
one, this node becomes blacklisted for the purpose of creating
future blocks by decreasing its reputation index.
Something to stake rule: if a fork in the chain occurs, a miner
could have the intention to not promote the longest chain. He
signs his block on every branch of the fork and receives both
fees. Any other further miner can include it as evidence in the
block that he/she creates, in order to confiscate at least the fee
that the bad miner obtained.
V. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER WORK
We propose an adaptation of the blockchain technology for
energy communities, in order to offer an efficient and resilient
way to support transactions within an energy community, but
also to get it accepted by the wholesale market. However,
the blockchain proposed in this paper, specifically for energy
communities, has characteristics that are not compatible with
the main existing blockchain technologies based on Bitcoin
and Ethereum, mainly because their consensus method is based
on Proof of work instead of Proof of Stake and therefore
these technologies are not able to satisfy market step timing
requirement.
The topics discussed hereafter have only been touched
upon in this article and deserve further development and
validation. Having a synchronous time stamp is key to respect
the market time steps. There are several ways to meet this
requirement and a comparison is worthwhile. To do so, in a
future work, a simulation environment will be established to
test the feasibility of a time stamp but also to try different
voting strategies for candidate miners. An implicit assumption
in the proposed design is that there are no grid energy losses.
The integration of energy losses in the concept, and how to
settle them, is a very important topic. We have not discussed
about the transaction rate within a market time step. This
could be very important and need to be tackled with caution,
while the blockchain community, micro payment channels
are considered one of the most promising solutions to this
problem. Finally, we considered that the virtual generation
meter is a dead end for transactions but consumers may want
to agree to exchange between each other a part of the energy
recorded in their virtual generation meter, and, by doing so,
create a local market. This can open up additional security
issues since more parties can have an interest in defrauding
the system (and not only the VPP).
[5] F. Olivier, D. Marulli, D. Ernst, and R. Fonteneau, “Foreseeing new
control challenges in electricity prosumer communities,” in Proc. of the
10th Bulk Power Systems Dynamics and Control Symposium – IREP
2017, 2017.
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